1 2 3	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS WESTERN SECTION
4 5 6 7 8	George Perrot )
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10	Motion Hearing Held Before
11	The Honorable Douglas P. Woodlock
12	United States District Judge
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16	APPEARANCES: See the following page
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1 APPEARANCES: 2. On behalf of the plaintiff: 3 4 Tara Elizabeth Thompson, 311 N. Aberdeen Street, 3rd Floor, Chicago, IL 60607. 5 6 7 On behalf of the defendants: 8 Lisa C. DeSousa, 1600 East Columbus Ave., Springfield, MA 01103. 9 10 Glenn S. Greene, P.O. Box 7146, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, DC 20044. 11 Kathleen E. Sheehan, 293 Bridge Street, Suite 600, Springfield, MA 01103. 12 13 Carole Sakowski Lynch, Towersquare Building, Suite 2400, 1500 Main Street, PO Box 15387, Springfield, MA 14 01115-5387. 15 Austin M. Joyce, 4 Lancaster Terrace, Worcester, MA 01609. 16 Jeremy Saint Laurent, 36 Court Street, Springfield, MA 01103. 17 18 Susan G. Reardon, One Ashburton Place, 18th Floor, Boston, 19 MA 02108. 20 21 22 23 2.4 25

THE CLERK: This honorable court is now in session. Please be seated.

Civil Action No. 18-10147, Perrot versus Kelly. If counsel can be please identify yourselves prior to addressing the court.

THE COURT: So let's see if I can do a little bit of housekeeping and get this in place.

I guess the place I would like to start is transfer of venue. I'm not sure why it's made with the motion to dismiss practice initially.

We were kind of surprised that we got a call saying that counsel for the City wanted to participate by phone. Is it pretty hard to get up State Street?

MS. DeSOUSA: I'm sorry, that was a misstatement in my office. We thought we were in Boston today so I apologize for that.

THE COURT: You did?

MS. DeSOUSA: It got diaried incorrectly in my office and it looked like we were in Boston today so I apologize for that.

THE COURT: Well, I take it that this should be sharpened a bit because it does suggest a lack of attention to the case. But if I were treating this as a motion for transfer which was made when the Rule 12 motion was made, it was not filed then. It took three months to

think about it. So why?

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MS. DeSOUSA: Frankly, Your Honor, we assumed erroneously that counsel for the plaintiff would be willing to conduct the pretrial discovery in Springfield since the vast majority of the deponents, as well as the vast majority of counsel --

THE COURT: We have rules for that. If there's depositions to be taken in the Western division, they could be done in Springfield. I don't understand this.

MS. DeSOUSA: Frankly, Your Honor, neither did we.

THE COURT: Did you make a motion?

MS. DeSOUSA: We did not. We made --

THE COURT: Okay. So what you did was you waited three months to move to transfer the case after you seen who the judge is?

MS. DeSOUSA: No.

THE COURT: No. No. Just a moment. That's what happened. That's the timing. People can draw whatever conclusions they want to draw about it, but in a dilatory fashion the City of Springfield -- which has a tickler system that makes them think they're in Boston when they're in Springfield -- makes this motion saying that it's because there's a problem about discovery in Springfield and never makes a motion about adjusting that,

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which is easily done. It probably can be done less than three months such a motion.

So the problem I have is this: I was assigned this case. Springfield is a courthouse with a single-district judge. It implicates some important matters in the Western division of the state. It also involves district attorneys' offices and so there's a potential for a series of recusal motions here.

My own view is that if the case gets tried, it's tried out here. I'll try it out here. If there's some problem about adjusting discovery, I can work that out too. But I just don't see (A) why you waited so long and (B) -- maybe we're beyond that, although that will be sufficient grounds to deny it -- (B), what the problem is about discovery because nobody really has made that clear to me.

MS. DeSOUSA: Again, Your Honor, there were numerous emails between our office and counsel for --

THE COURT: What emails?

MS. DeSOUSA: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: What emails?

MS. DeSOUSA: I did not attach them in my --

THE COURT: So I'm supposed to rule on something

that I don't have evidence for?

MS. DeSOUSA: I can represent as an officer of

the court within the motion to change venue that they were unwilling to schedule depositions in Springfield.

THE COURT: Okay. So the deponents are all living in Springfield, is that right?

MS. DeSOUSA: All of the deponents that have been marked up to date that I represent or that are current or former employees of the City of Springfield.

THE COURT: So what's the problem?

MS. THOMPSON: Judge, we never said we wouldn't do depositions in Springfield.

THE COURT: Okay. Now that tells me all I need to know, which is that you are going to be very careful in the future about raising matters like this. This is sandbox stuff and it is beneath the dignity of members of the bar.

The short of it is discovery should take place in Springfield if people are in Springfield. If not, then wherever they are. If somebody is in Florida -- apparently there are some people who are in the next life that the plaintiffs continue to pursue, but I'm not transferring the venue now for this belatedly.

If this case has evidentiary hearings that require my attention, I'll do it out here. I've done it before. I think that's my responsibility here.

I suspect that after a certain amount of time that

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the City of Springfield might well even consider whether or not it wants to have the case tried outside of this division for purposes of jury taint, but that's to be dealt with at a later point.

MS. DeSOUSA: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So that motion, which is number 96, is denied.

Now, did I get all this? There really has been no discovery?

MS. THOMPSON: We've conducted depositions in Springfield up to this point, Your Honor. We've done two. We have another one scheduled for the 17th and we have been trying to work out dates for defendant Bloom who we hope to do in December but who I think was not available given counsels' schedule until January. We've served written discovery requests. We received back interrogatories and some documents so discovery is proceeding, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So when is it that you think you're going to have an amended complaint?

MS. THOMPSON: We have a couple of additional Springfield defendants that we want to depose still before we're able to do that, but we hope to get them done in -- one we have scheduled in December and in the early weeks of January. If we can have until the end of January, we

would be prepared to amend then, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: So the motion for extension of time to file the first amended complaint to November 5th has been overtaken by time, is that it?

MS. THOMPSON: It has, Your Honor. We would agree --

THE COURT: Is that real, that time that you're talking about? Is that real for this because I'm going to treat the complaint with real rigger? The blunderbuss approach to pleading is not going to last forever. So are you going to be able in a date that I will establish in January?

MS. THOMPSON: I believe that we are, Your
Honor. I understand the court is telling us this is a
real deadline and the court expects to see an amended
pleading. We want to do the same. I believe defendants'
counsel have been cooperative with us in scheduling.
There's been some difficulties. If we can get these
depositors done, we will be in a position to amend.

THE COURT: Apparently they thought that those depositions weren't going to take place in Springfield just like they thought this hearing wasn't going to take place in Springfield. So that's a misunderstanding?

MS. THOMPSON: I've been to depositions in Springfield for this case and defendant Bloom's counsel

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asked to be deposed in Boston because that's where he resides. We will honor that, but we're not dragging people to Boston that live in Springfield. That's not ever been our position.

THE COURT: What date in January? Bear in mind that this has to include a Federal Tort Claims Act.

MS. THOMPSON: Understood, sir. If we can have until the end of January to finish the necessary discovery, we'll file our amended complaint by February 1st if that's acceptable.

THE COURT: Okay. February 1st, and I expect that counsel will be reluctantly here and knowledgeable of where they're supposed to be.

Now turning to the complaint itself, I want to make sure that I haven't missed something because there's been a tsunami of paperwork that's been submitted in connection with this.

I want to turn in particular to the claim itself with the section that deals with claim of exoneration. There's a reference to finality of October 2017. This is paragraph 125.

MS. THOMPSON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And some sort of it appears to be a writing I assume of Judge King. I haven't been able to find it anywhere. Is it anywhere in the papers? I have

1 the nolle pross. 2 MS. THOMPSON: It was an opinion granting him a 3 new trial and I do not have a copy with me. 4 THE COURT: That's January 26, 2016. 5 reported in West law. Now there's a reference here to 6 "plaintiff was granted post-conviction relief, final 7 October 11th. The court held that the admission of flawed 8 evidence cast real doubt on the justice of plaintiff's 9 conviction." I assume that that's something on October 10 11th, is it or not? 11 MS. THOMPSON: I confess I do not know 12 specifically where that quote comes from. 13 THE COURT: So what I think I'm going to ask is that you provide it to me within say four days. 14 15 MS. THOMPSON: I will, Your Honor. THE COURT: And that my only view is that if 16 17 you're going to be relying on these kinds of documents 18 which become part of the complaint anyway, that they be 19 attached to the amended complaint --20 MS. THOMPSON: Yes, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: -- that you file. Now, this question of the plaintiff -- let me step 22 23 back a bit. What do you think you're going to get from these dead 24 25 people?

1	MS. THOMPSON: We believe under the statute that
2	the City has a duty to indemnify them. I mean obviously
3	now we're talking about them but we are talking about the
4	one person that we're seeking to appoint.
5	THE COURT: I thought there were two now.
6	MS. THOMPSON: It's only Mr. Kelly, Your Honor,
7	and that's
8	THE COURT: You made an amended effort to have
9	me appoint a person to represent him?
10	MS. THOMPSON: For Mr. Kelly.
11	THE COURT: Right. Wasn't there another?
12	MS. THOMPSON: We did also learn that there was
13	an additional person that was deceased, Your Honor, but
14	he's not
15	THE COURT: You don't want me to appoint a
16	person to represent that additional person?
17	MS. THOMPSON: We are only seeking an
18	appointment related to Mr. Kelly.
19	THE COURT: So the additional person is not
20	going to be a party in this case?
21	MS. THOMPSON: That's right, Your Honor.
22	THE COURT: All right. So back to what you
23	think you're going to get from the dead person?
24	MS. THOMPSON: The statute requires
25	indemnification and we
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THE COURT: Perhaps. In any event, so you get a judgment and the judgment can be assessed against the City of Springfield; is that what you're suggesting? MS. THOMPSON: Well, the judgment could be assessed against the estate. THE COURT: Correct. The estate -- a representative of the estate is going to go after the City of Springfield to get the money to put back into the estate to provide funds for whatever judgment you get; is that it? MS. THOMPSON: Our client would be a beneficiary; we can also seek that as well. THE COURT: Pardon me? MS. THOMPSON: Our client would be a beneficiary as well. THE COURT: I understand that's the theory. the theory is that you will get a judgment. The judgment should result in indemnification from the City and that indemnification from the City becomes part of the estate which is reopened and then your client can make a claim on that reopened estate? Yes, Your Honor. MS. THOMPSON: Okay. Where is the estate closed? THE COURT: MS. THOMPSON: It was in Massachusetts, Your It was in Hampden County Probate Court, Your

Honor.

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THE COURT: Okay. So why don't you go into the Hampden County Probate Court?

MS. THOMPSON: It is a complicated process to do this in the state court and it is true --

THE COURT: It's an unknown process in the federal court except in the Seventh Circuit in which the court thought it was useful to appoint somebody to participate as plaintiff to move forward but this is core probate stuff.

I have a question of whether I even have jurisdiction to do something like that, putting aside what the Seventh Circuit finds convenient. This much I know in that 30 years on the bench I haven't done it. This is core probate and family court work.

I've had it done where lawyers go into the state court because, as you say, it is a complex process and it's made more complex by a variety different dimensions to it, not the least of which is this question of indemnification, and a probate court judge may well take a position that it's not worth pursuing indemnification or not. I don't know, but that is very much core state activity. And if it weren't a matter of jurisdiction for me, I think that I would be abstaining in this hearing.

I realize there's been some erosion of the probate

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exception. The <u>Perez</u> case, the <u>Marshal</u> case, but for a federal judge to administer an estate and reopen it through the appointment of someone in a county in which that judge has some familiarity -- not that I would do it for Essex county or Suffix -- it seems to be foolish in an effort at trying to pursue a questionable initiative like this.

If you want it, you go into the probate court in Hampden County. I'm not going to do it and you're going to have to do it in 90 days --

MS. THOMPSON: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- if you want to proceed with this.

So I am denying the motion to number 79 for the corrected motion to appoint a special representative as to Kelly.

I'm denying the motion for leave to file a second corrected motion to appoint a special representative for Kelly, that's 81.

I take the representation that there are no more dead people going to be parties in this case?

MS. THOMPSON: I believe we have confirmed that now, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So then we turn to this question of striking the summons and the execution of the summons. I'm not so certain that the City defendants are

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in a position to make such a motion. I'm in a position to look at it. I find it to be ineffective service here and if I'm not mistaken we're only talking about Kelly, right?

MS. THOMPSON: That's right. That's right, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So the special representative that you'll get in the Hampden Probate Court will be making whatever arrangements.

MS. THOMPSON: We would then seek, Your Honor, an extension of time to effect service until such time as we have an opportunity to seek to reopen.

THE COURT: Well, such time kind of spins -- I said 90 days that you have to get a special representative; that representative you'll get in 90 days so you've got 90 days to perfect service.

MS. THOMPSON: Okay.

THE COURT: So I'm denying the motion number 61 to strike since they don't -- the party who made the motion has any standing to do so, but it does call to my attention something that's apparent in the record which is there is a failure to provide to a return of service and focusing only on the defendant, the late-defendant Kelly. As to him I will extend the period of time 90 days to effect proper service which I understand will be through a personal representative. That seems to be about the only

way that you will be able to get service here. If there's another way, I'm sure you will bring it to my attention. The way that was chosen was not an appropriate way.

So then I come back to -- or I should say I come to the motion of the two federal defendants here and that raises some daunting questions I suppose under <u>Bivens</u> particularly given Justice Kennedy's final statements with respect to that. I guess I've waited until and unless I have to, but I have some questions about the nature of the pleadings as they exist now.

Just a moment now --

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MR. GREENE: Sure.

THE COURT: -- a comment from counsel on this. About the nature of the pleadings which seem to be quite conclusory, not casual and to the degree that there's a suggestion that they're factual, I want to be sure that everyone is aware of the vitality of Rule 11 when making claims of essentially obstruction of justice which are serious claims. But I look at this now and it seems to be, presently as pled, it seems to me to be conclusory in nature, so conclusory is making it difficult to determine whether or not it's plausible.

I guess there are a couple of ways dealing with it which is to say wait until the long-awaited first amended complaint is received or go through this step by step, the

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first step being I guess paragraph 65 and thereafter of the complaint.

Any way of looking at the terms and understanding more broadly the terms, whether they're appropriately determinative on a motion to dismiss is not a matter, but is that there was a late awareness of the shortcomings of the science of this kind of expertise. It's recited at a point in Judge Cain's decision of January 26, 2016. He seems to have gone through this quite carefully.

As it happened in the Obama administration there was an extensive evaluation of forensic evidence, scientific evidence that parallels this, but for the received wisdom -- let's say I received it from Judge Cain in his opinion is what people thought was science or at least forensic science, meaning as Warren Black once put it, a government architecture is to architecture, military music is to music and forensic science is to science; military music is to music, which is something less than completely vigorous has now been focused a bit since the time period on which this took place and we had two people, Eubanks and Oaks, working in a vineyard that's turned out not to be very productive. But to say that they did things falsely, falsely reported is a little bit more than I think I can take on just the pleadings like this. guess I don't understand what evidence there is to support the allegations that are made here.

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At one level I guess I can say false reports means that this was not rigorous enough science to meet current standards, even the current standards that the jurists itself is using as they did apparently go back into this once it was brought to their attention or at least having been brought to their attention and back into it, not treating this kind of evidence the same way it did before, nor are courts. But if falsely reported simply means that this was someone who believes that the universe revolved around the earth until Galileo suggested otherwise, then I'm not sure that that falls in the category of false reporting at least as I understand it.

So I guess I have a two-step process. Number one, is your false tort claims -- Federal Tort Claims Act case going to address negligence on the part of the bureau employees? Is that going to be raised there, or are you simply either have it in front of this set of allegations here against the individuals personally or not at all?

MS. THOMPSON: I will confess that I don't know the answer to the court's question because it's something that we have to consider, but I agree with the court that as to these claims this is not about something that they -- you know, we said this in our response to the motion to dismiss that someone can't be liable for something that

they don't do -- they can certainly do unintentionally.

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So this isn't about as we have explained in our pleading, although perhaps inartfully, this is not about new science superceded what Oaks and Eubanks had to say. This is a case where the Springfield defendants talked with Oaks, tell him what they are intending to do, meet with him before the comparison is done, and even as the state court found defendant Oaks in particular slipped from being -- the court's word -- slipped from being a partisan in the case based on that conversation and it is our contention --

THE COURT: It happens all the time. I mean, you have to have fallen off the turnip truck not to understand the way in which there are interrelationships between experts and those that they are providing expertise from that leads to a kind of combination bias in all that they do. That's the subject frequently of cross-examination.

If somebody goes in the tank, if somebody says I don't care what the evidence is I'm going to say something else or that is I know wrong, then maybe we've got a problem, a problem that can survive qualified immunity.

To be sure, you have nothing -- and you will tell me otherwise -- you really have nothing testimonial that can survive absolute immunity, do you?

MS. THOMPSON: We are not making any allegations about testimony.

THE COURT: So nothing testimonial. So now we are talking about back and forth between experts, the two experts themselves and the prosecution team. I'll put it that way, the state prosecution team, and there you're saying they just got too close or are you saying they went in the bag?

MS. THOMPSON: We're saying they went in the bag.

THE COURT: How did they do that? Maybe the way to explore this a bit is to say that to look at paragraph 70 of your complaint. It says, "On information and belief, defendant Oakes had discussed with other hair microscopists, including unknown agents, the best way to conceal the incriminating evidence." What's the basis for that?

MS. THOMPSON: It's an allegation that we're making on information and belief that he --

THE COURT: I understand it's an allegation you're making on information and belief. I find it less than plausible. So in order to make a plausible allegation like that, I have to have some rigor detail, something. You know, on information and belief isn't I'm looking in the air plucking it out like that and saying we

are making that allegation. What's the information? 1 2. What's the belief? MS. THOMPSON: The information is that he could 3 -- and it is based on our view of the evidence that we 4 5 have so far about this case. This is not something that 6 he necessarily came up with himself, but that he conferred 7 with others because he needed --8 THE COURT: Who? MS. THOMPSON: Unknown defendants. We don't 9 10 know. 11 THE COURT: How do you know he conferred with 12 others? 13 MS. THOMPSON: Because this is something that he would have needed to have talked with other people about, 14 15 how to frame these results in a way that made them seem plausible when fact he knew --16 THE COURT: He conferred with others about the 17 18 best way to conceal? 19 MS. THOMPSON: Yes. 20 THE COURT: Who were the others that he 21 conferred with about the best way to conceal? 22 MS. THOMPSON: We don't know. 23 THE COURT: But you said that you have information, not just information alone or belief alone, 24 information and belief. What is the information? 25

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I mean, maybe I've been too general. Rule 11 means something. This is a very serious allegation against someone. There better be a basis for it. It's not enough to say, well, we kind of pulled it together. We thought as a matter of circumstantial evidence we can hang all these guys together.

You made an allegation that they concealed incriminating evidence and talked about it and you say you did it on information, and I've asked now what the information is and I haven't gotten an answer yet. Who is your informant for this?

MS. THOMPSON: I want to be clear about what I'm saying to the court so let me try to state this in a clear way.

It is unusual in my experience to have a meeting between detectives and -- or a meeting between the prosecuting agency, as the court said, the people involved in prosecting a case, and the scientific analyst before their opinion comes back where by admission -- this is what came out in the state court proceedings -- that the state actors explained to these agents what it is that they -- what was going on in this case and what was happening. That does -- the court indicated that it's not unusual for that but it is in my experience.

THE COURT: Well, I guess I can't introduce my

own experience here, can I? I cannot do that, but it provides a background against which I evaluate the plausibility of something.

So not to introduce it but just to provide a sense of background. I've worked for four years as an assistant U.S. attorney. I was the head of the state public defender agency. I've been on the court for over 30 years. For more than 30 years I've observed these kinds of cases. It is bad practice no question about it. The bureau ought to be embarrassed, they were, by this kind of faux science that we now know could be faux science, but that's different from saying concealed incriminating evidence.

That's sloppy -- well, more than sloppy. It's just an unprofessional practice. On the other hand, qualified immunity probably provides protection for sloppiness and lack of professionalism, and so for me to analyze this complaint in that context requires that I do something more than look at on information.

I asked the question and it appears that it is on the basis of your experience that this must have been conversations about the best way to conceal incriminating evidence; is that it?

MS. THOMPSON: The other important piece of this, Your Honor, is --

THE COURT: Well, is that it? 1 2. That's not it. That's not the MS. THOMPSON: 3 only issue. 4 THE COURT: So apart from your perception of 5 your experience, what else is there? 6 MS. THOMPSON: We know that, we know that the 7 conclusions as reported -- and it's not about the 8 testimony, although the testimony repeats it. We know the 9 conclusions as reported are false. The question is why. 10 As the court has indicated, there is some analysis 11 that's done by the FBI's own audit about why it is that 12 these reported results were false and that audit does not 13 exculpate these defendants. It does not say we know with certainty that these were good-faith mistakes. It just 14 15 says there's mistakes. 16 THE COURT: You understand what you have to 17 prove to get beyond immunity? 18 MS. THOMPSON: Understood. We have to prove 19 probably and we have alleged a knowing fabrication and 20 that's what we're saying happened. 21 THE COURT: Now I'm asking what's the known 22 fabrication? What do you know about known fabrication

that permits you to say that? Do you have someone who was

in a meeting and they said the evidence is really lousy

here. We've got to falsely create a report and we've got

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to conceal other incriminating evidence?

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MS. THOMPSON: Based on how wrong these results are, we have made a good-faith allegation about what we expect that the evidence can show. It's true that we need discovery to prove up our claims.

THE COURT: See that's the conundrum of discovery in the face of pleading objections. You don't really get to come in and say I don't know but I think and so I brought this lawsuit to find out. That's not the way it goes.

You have to have a good-faith basis supported by facts for making an allegation like this, and I'm suggesting to you -- perhaps more gently as I said than the circumstances suggest -- that this has some potential Rule 11 problems, and you better be very certain about the basis that you would rely on as good faith.

So far what I understand it to be is your experience that what's probably likely under these circumstances that in the circumstance of the prosecution team and experts meeting and talking about what the thrust of their case is that they would necessarily have discussed concealing incriminating evidence. Now what's the incriminating evidence that they were concealing?

MS. THOMPSON: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: What's the incriminating evidence

1 that they're concealing? 2. MS. THOMPSON: Well, it's exculpatory evidence 3 that they were --4 THE COURT: It's what? MS. THOMPSON: That these defendants were 5 6 concealing exculpatory evidence. 7 THE COURT: What is it? 8 MS. THOMPSON: That these hair results in fact The other forensic --9 did not match Mr. Perrot. 10 THE COURT: Is that a product of faux science or 11 is it simply that they knew that one hair was a dog and 12 the other hair was Mr. Perrot's and they said they match? 13 Is that what you're saying? Or are you saying they had one hair and it was something, they didn't know what, and 14 based on their belief and the science at the time they 15 16 said it is consistent with or is in fact Mr. Perrot's hair? Is that the alternative? 17 18 You know, there are dog hair cases. Those get outside of immunity when somebody knows that the specimen 19 20 that they're relying upon, an unknown specimen is in fact 21 something that could never in a million years be the hair 22 of a potential defendant, but I don't understand that 23 that's here yet. I haven't heard you say that that's 24 here.

What I've heard in response is they were

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unprofessional in the sense of meeting with the prosecution team and learning what the outcome or the result of the prosecution team wanted and then conforming to it. Lack of professionalism is probably negligence. It doesn't strike me as an intentional tort in the sense of constitutional torts.

You said that there's concealment or falsity; falsity seems to tie right back into the question of junk science. But, for instance, was Mr. Eubanks or Mr. Oakes writing home saying I spend my day doing junk science? Is there some confession like that? Some acknowledgement that this is non-scientific? Or is it simply that you have done, more or less what they've done, which is to take the facts and try to meld them in to a way that supports the proposition for which you contend without underlying support for it?

So I have your idea of what is likely. Do I have any writings by these individuals, or do you have any writings by these individuals?

MS. THOMPSON: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you have any informant who says I sat at a meeting and they said we're going to falsify this evidence and we're going to conceal things that show otherwise?

MS. THOMPSON: We don't have that, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Okay. That's a pleading problem because I can't say that it plausibly asserts a claim against which a motion to dismiss on the basis of immunity would be resisted. And what are you going to do to deal with that perception on my part? MS. THOMPSON: Well, two things, Your Honor. One is if the court doesn't view our pleadings as sufficient, then we can replead and reallege it in a better way. THE COURT: Well, the question is can you? just told me that you don't have somebody who's giving you inside information. You don't have documents and you're relying on your perception of what likely happens under circumstances like this whenever experts and adversary parities get together to discuss how they're going to present the case. MS. THOMPSON: If a plaintiff in Mr. Perrot's position had to at the outset --THE COURT: Excuse me. Should I be pronouncing it Perott rather than Perrot? MS. THOMPSON: Our understanding is it's Perrot, Your Honor. THE COURT: Perrot. If a person in plaintiff's MS. THOMPSON:

position in order to allege -- in order to file a

complaint about the situation that arose in this case had to say I know somebody who was at the meeting, here's what was said, somebody in Mr. Perrot's position would never get to sue someone who's in these defendants' context.

Maybe the court believes that's appropriate, but that puts a burden on Mr. Perrot that no one in his position is ever going to be able to meet.

What he has here is --

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THE COURT: That's not true. It happens all the time. I get these information and belief pleadings all the time and then I say all right. What is it? Now is the time to tell us and I get somebody say, I knew the guy who delivered the coffee and he was there and he heard it. So that's not (A) as a practical matter in my experience always the case but the burden is with you. The burden is with you to show that there are facts upon which you can reasonably rely to overcome the immunity defense that is going to be raised as to this.

I have indicated before that there are issues with respect to the pleadings that may be remediable. That's what we're doing now. On this one I don't know if it's remediable. What you are asking for that would be remediable that could provide the foundation that could ever come is the likely restated view or restated motion to dismiss dealing just with the question of immunity for

these defendants. If I thought there was a prospect, I'd certainly want to consider it fully but you hadn't told me that's a prospect. Is there one?

MS. THOMPSON: I don't know how to state it at this point any better than this. We know that we are talking about false reports and the question is why.

THE COURT: When you say false, I just want to be clear false means bad science. It doesn't mean that the report said X and it was not X in some verifiable form. That it said it was raining on Friday and it wasn't raining on Friday.

This is simply -- I say simply, this is bad science, not very good science. On the other hand, science that was accepted in courts throughout this time period; that the scientific community didn't really focus on effectively for some time and these guys were practicing this -- if it's not science, I guess it must be art but not necessarily doing it in a way that was believed that what they were doing was false, intentionally false.

Unless you got something more specific than that, that's what I'm trying to get at.

MS. THOMPSON: We have pled this in the alternative. One way that we've pled it is that these defendants knew that these were not matches and reported them as matches, that's one thing. The second I think

what the court's talking about --

THE COURT: But what do you have to say that they knew it wasn't matching, a match? I said -- I used the dog hair one because those are the most graphic examples of this kind of thing and ones which I have some familiarity with. Those are easy. You know, somebody knows it's dog and they say it's human hair. That happens, false, but that's not what you're saying here I don't think.

As I listen to what you're saying is this was lousy science. Nobody could get matches that anybody could call science that you could say to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty or follicle certainty this was the same hair or even consistently the same hair.

Now we know or we think we know -- maybe the defendants don't argue otherwise -- now we know this is not good science. But the question for these claims, which as I say is very inflammatory and in a way that the court should not foster unless there's support as I say under Rule 11. I don't know that you have that.

So I'm inviting you to tell me what you've got here. Is there somebody who's in hiding in Idaho in a cave afraid that the FBI will come after them, well, maybe I'll think about you saying informant X but I don't think you have that.

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MS. THOMPSON: We don't have anyone in a cave in Idaho. Again, Your Honor, it's our assertion that's not what the pleading requirements require.

We have alleged -- and I understand the court disagrees with me. I'm not trying to -- I understand what the court's view of this is and the court knows what I know at this point.

What we have allege is that these defendants understood the limitations of the science that they were proceeding under. They understood even -- they understood, number one, the limitations of the science that reporting somebody as a match under the science in this situation was overstating the evidence and that's not a -- we're saying that's not an innocent mistake. We're saying that's a knowing issue. That these defendants knew that the science didn't support a conclusion that these hair comparisons could be made with the other forensic evidence.

THE COURT: Are you saying the science as it existed then? I mean that goes to this question of their knowing.

MS. THOMPSON: Right.

THE COURT: If they are United Believers backers or earth centric universes, I suppose I would say that they don't quite have the intent that is necessary.

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MS. THOMPSON: I agree, United Believers are -THE COURT: So what are you saying that this is
something other than people who worked in this lab at the
bureau who had developed some techniques that they thought
were useful that they knew it wasn't? That they knew it
didn't meet any kind of outside standard? That it was
then extant?

MS. THOMPSON: What the FBI -- and the court obviously has familiarity with this. What the FBI's audit concluded was not that the methodology -- it's not just about methodology. It's about the way that the certainty and sort of the -- it's the way that the certainty of the comparison is being testified to and reported about.

So it's not even the methodology of hair comparison. It's understanding does the fact that there are certain similarities between certain hairs mean that these hairs are the same to the exclusion of all others? Can you look at two hairs that are similar and say these two are similar, therefore, we know they came from the same person or do --

THE COURT: Why isn't that just sub-competent?

I'm looking at this and I have some -- well, I shouldn't say I have some familiarity, but we've had cases of false drug reports, all of the state district attorneys' cases involving drugs and a new wave of them is present out here

in Western Massachusetts.

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Those are people posing to be scientists who didn't do anything or they made stuff up. That's different from somebody who thinks they knew what they're doing and whatever they're doing is not science, and that distinction probably plots pretty well along the lines of between immunity and lack of immunity.

So I look at this and say, is there any way on God's green earth that this thing can make it past the immunity claim? It doesn't now. I want you to understand that it is not plausible now. It's not plausible in part because of the severity of the claims made with respect to these two individuals.

In order to make them plausible in this larger context, I need something that shows me that they weren't sub-competent; that they knew what they were doing was just plain wrong, and I don't hear anything that you've said that tells me that you have that.

Now let me go back to where I started before. What's your Federal Tort Claims Act? What have you teed up your Federal Court Claim Act?

MS. THOMPSON: We've teed it up in the same way. I understand the court's question about whether there's some sort of negligence claim that we could potentially pursue. That's not -- what we intend to allege is the

same thing. We believe this is not a case about a mistake. This is a case about people participating in a conspiracy to frame Mr. Perrot.

THE COURT: So I'm not in the business of advising how to draft a complaint, but I mean you're going to neglect negligence?

MS. THOMPSON: Honestly that's not where we've -- that's not where we believe this case is at, but I hear what the court is saying.

THE COURT: Well, it's up to you. Let me just say that I will do with this what I have done with the previous ones, which is to say I'll deny the motion to dismiss without prejudice to it being raised again upon the First Amended complaint with this adjuration that this is a bit more than simply filling in the dots.

This is something that I view as raising serious issues under Rule 11 and you'll evaluate your pleading in that context. I'm not sure there's more I need to say.

I'm going to let you develop your case in your pleadings.

There is no question that this is a horrific set of circumstances. The larger question is, are any of the defendants you allege here responsible in some way that the court's going to identify?

The claim is alleged in an incendiary fashion and I'm not sure that there's even smoke to support that kind of

fire with this kind of a claim.

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So I made the government sit down while I asked some questions. You've kind of heard the bottom line; perhaps you want to argue the bottom line right now, but I think that's where I am on this.

You can let me -- if I have to, I'll define the larger principles of <u>Bivens</u> but I don't think I have to and I don't think I want to because I think it is an area that is simply too over-textured right now. Go ahead.

MR. GREENE: I represent the U.S. Department of Justice representing Special Agents Eubanks and Oakes.

As the court is familiar, the court instructed that the district courts have to first determine whether or not there is a <u>Bivens</u> before proceeding and as we have argued in our motion the way that analysis is done there should be no *Bivens*.

THE COURT: All right. My view of it this, on that issue is to say that if there is in this uncertainty context of reaching <u>Bivens</u>, if there's no clearly available alternative grounds and that's the basically pleadings ground, we reach that first without going to offer scenarios of <u>Bivens</u> so that's really what I'm doing here.

MR. GREENE: Understood. We'd also argue that under qualified immunity defendants have a right to have

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that determined before discovery commences so is the court denying defendants' motion for qualified immunity?

THE COURT: You said that -- I think my view on it is that I don't see a need for any further -- any discovery. You've got a motion to stay the discovery in place right now. I don't see any further discovery here. There was a full hearing with respect to this in state court where this evidence could be developed by that plaintiff, isn't that protecting you?

MR. GREENE: Just to be clear, you are granting the motion to stay discovery?

THE COURT: I'll wan't to hear anything further that counsel has to say on this, but it's very hard when you don't know everything to plead and so you should start the lawsuit to get discovery to find out whether or not you got a good lawsuit, that doesn't do it.

Is there something more you want to say? You did have a full extensive hearing in the state court before Judge King?

MS. THOMPSON: The only thing I'll say is the purpose of that hearing was not to decide if anybody was liable. That goes to the whole --

THE COURT: It may not be but it certainly was to decide whether or not there's a basis to get a new trial because there was lousy science presented to the

state court.

MS. THOMPSON: The only issue there was, was the science lousy. It wasn't --

THE COURT: The issue to be fully developed there was whether or not there were grounds as a result of the testimony and certain reports by the federal bureau agents so I can't see it here. It wasn't brought up.

I don't see a need for further discovery particularly in light of the alternative or competing consideration of not eviscerating or eroding the concept of qualified immunity by saying you've got qualified immunity for this so just bring a lawsuit, then we get to conduct discovery for awhile unless there's some more specifics.

MS. THOMPSON: We're asking for discovery but I understand that we need to approach the court through a better pleading that we deserve it first and that's what we will do.

THE COURT: Okay. That's where we are on that.

That is to say, with respect to the motion to stay

discovery, which is number 89, I will allow that.

With respect to the motion to dismiss number 71 for failure to state a claim on behalf of the Agents Eubanks and Oakes, I'm denying that without prejudice to its being reasserted when the first amended complaint gets filed the 1st of February.

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MS. THOMPSON: The only thing I would ask, Your Honor, there obviously is discovery from Eubanks and Oakes that relates to our claims against the Springfield defendants, so it's discovery that we believe we're entitled to whether or not these defendants remain defendants.

THE COURT: That may be so, but you don't need it with respect to your claims. You don't really need it with respect to these defendants either. Either you have the other defendants, the non-federal defendants, you either have it or you don't.

MS. THOMPSON: I'm saying Oakes, for instance, was in this meeting with these defendants talking about or these defendants made representations to him about the case so obviously that's something we need at some point in this litigation.

THE COURT: You may. The government will have to consider that in <u>Touhy</u> in writing. That's their constraints upon the testimony that the agents can give and there's a form for doing that. I don't mean to stretch that by the method that I'm affording you to assure that you've got a complaint that is as good as it can be at the outset.

MS. THOMPSON: I just want to make sure that we can pursue what we believe we're entitled to whether or

not they're defendants without running a fowl of the 1 2 court's stay order. 3 THE COURT: Well, yes, although I don't think 4 that you're going to get deposition testimony from either 5 of one them in the next 90 days. 6 MS. THOMPSON: I think it's more a documentary 7 issue. 8 THE COURT: What are the documents? We don't know what --9 MS. THOMPSON: 10 THE COURT: Wait a minute. What documents? 11 They may have records relating to MS. THOMPSON: 12 these meetings, relating to their communication of these 13 defendants. 14 THE COURT: They probably have to turn them over 15 in time, something like that over sometime. So what's the 16 response, just dig in? MR. GREENE: Your Honor, we believe that the 17 18 defendants are protected from discovery until their 19 qualified immunity issue is resolved. 20 THE COURT: They may be, but if they're out of 21 the case and nevertheless there's a record concerning 22 efforts to get discovery, once you jump through Touhy. 23 MR. GREENE: Sure. I'm certainly not suggesting 24 that if the FBI were to get a third-party subpoena or some 25 other request for documents, that the FBI wouldn't comply

with it if I believe that's what counsel is suggesting.

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THE COURT: That's what I'm suggesting, which is that I will permit her to do third-party subpoenas in this interim period to get whatever documents.

MS. THOMPSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That's the limitation; that the stay is except as to providing third-party subpoenas or I should say subpoena ducus tecum in documents related to specific meetings.

MS. THOMPSON: Understood.

THE COURT: Okay. Now I anticipate that we will all get to think deeply about the pleadings after February 1st here but I need to move this case along as best I can.

My view is that civilians in Springfield are entitled to come to Springfield. That the other parties will show up in Boston and may even have ticklers that show Boston and not Springfield here.

If there are practical issues, you tell me. I'll try to deal with that, but as far as I'm concerned this is a case I'm going to keep and deal with it in a fashion that causes the least amount of disruption to the entire system, including the assignment of judges in this district.

Are there any other matters that I should be thinking about here or you'd like some direction on?

Okay. So February 1st is what I really look forward to. I also look forward to getting a copy of whatever it was that you were alluding to in paragraphs 125. MS. THOMPSON: We will provide that promptly, Your Honor. THE COURT: Anything else? All right. THE CLERK: All rise. (Hearing concluded at 11:07.) CERTIFICATION I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter to the best of my skill and ability. /s/ Alice Moran December 21, 2018 Alice Moran, RMR, RPR Federal Official Court Reporter